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Residents read morning newspapers at a roadside stall in Karachi on 11 May 2025 reporting India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire (Asif Hassan/AFP via Getty Images)

India-Pakistan ceasefire: Modi faces “re-hyphenation” challenge after Trump’s Kashmir mediation claims

Has India changed position on third party mediation in the longstanding dispute?

Rushali Saha

12 May 20254 min read

US President Donald Trump’s weekend announcement of a US mediated “full and immediate ceasefire” between India and Pakistan surprised both domestic and international observers. It came just days after a statement by Vice President JD Vance that the United States would not “get involved”, calling fighting between the two nuclear armed countries “fundamentally none of our business”.

But the exact nature of the US involvement remains unclear. Roughly half an hour after Trump’s declaration, India’s foreign secretary held a special briefing to announce that the Director General of Military Operations of Pakistan had initiated a call with his Indian counterpart and both sides agreed to “stop all firing and military action on land and in the air and sea,” making no mention of United States. In contrast, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif went on air to not only acknowledge but thank Trump for his “leadership and proactive role” in facilitating the ceasefire, as well as Vance and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio for their “valuable contributions for peace in South Asia.”

New Delhi’s reluctance to accept even a faciliatory role played by a third party is historically rooted. It stems from India’s long standing opposition to outside mediation and its position that the issue is strictly bilateral, and will be dealt with bilaterally. Unsurprisingly, Trump’s offer of working with both partners to arrive at a “solution” concerning Kashmir has sparked public outrage, although as of yet, there has been no official reaction by the Indian government.

History is needed to understand India’s strong opposition to mediation on the protracted and intractable Kashmir dispute. The dispute is not merely over territorial claims and colonial era demarcated borders, but one that is ideologically rooted in the very identity of both nations. Kashmir is constructed as an indisputable element of their statehood. So, any attempt to “separate” it is seen as violation of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Although it was India that first took the dispute to the United Nations, a sense of historical suspicion was instilled by New Delhi’s experiences of failed, or at best partially successful, mediated talks by the UN, World Bank, the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia in the 1950s and 1960s. Following the 1971 war, New Delhi was arguably in a much better negotiating position and got its way in the 1972 Simla Agreement, which clearly declares that both sides would settle all disputes through direct, bilateral negotiations. It is worth noting that Islamabad suspended the treaty as part of the tit-for-tat measures announced following India’s response to the 22 April Pahalgam terrorist attack.

Smoke billows after an explosion on 10 May 2025 in Jammu, India (Anindito Mukherjee/Getty Images)

Since 1972, India’s aspirations to establish itself as a regional, and subsequently global, leader, together with its economic strength, have added credence to New Delhi’s position that it does not require assistance in dealing with its neighbours. Frustrated by the repeated hyphenation of the two countries and in a bid to establish its dominant regional presence vis-à-vis Pakistan, through the 1990’s New Delhi pursued policies to “de-hyphenate” itself from Islamabad. So far, owing to structural changes in global geopolitics and careful diplomacy, New Delhi has been successful. But accepting mediation now could potentially “re-hyphenate” the relationship and adversely impact India’s global reputation.

However, the two countries have resorted to informal mechanisms, including international mediation, in the past. Both the 1948 and 1965 wars centred on Kashmir ended in a ceasefire through active intervention by the UN Security Council. The Soviet Union brokered the 1966 Tashkent Declaration and there are several documented examples of backchannel manoeuvring by friendly nations, including the United States, in the aftermath of 26 November terrorist outrage in 2008 and the air raid on Balakot in 2019. However, they have mostly been ad hoc and dependent on the evolving crisis.

Many are asking, why did another country announce that India’s armed forces would cease hostilities with Pakistan?

The closest both sides have come to overt and direct third party mediation was in 2021, following border skirmishes, when the United Arab Emirates reportedly brokered a ceasefire understanding between India and Pakistan. Both Pakistan and UAE have acknowledged this, but India has refrained from officially commenting. Neither was there any indication from New Delhi’s South Block about a policy change on its position on third party mediation.

These examples confirm that New Delhi is open to third party involvement vis-à-vis Pakistan when institutional mechanisms for diplomatic and political contacts have failed to diffuse a crisis. If New Delhi does confirm Washington’s role in brokering the latest ceasefire with Islamabad, it would only confirm this pattern, as the two sides came dangerously close to a war with consecutive cross border attacks and missile strikes. Yet equating such a position as acquiescing to mediation on the Kashmir dispute at large would be a gross overstretch.

As it currently stands, New Delhi faces a challenge. So far, the Pakistani narrative that the ceasefire has opened space for US mediation is yet to be countered. India’s population seems unhappy with the United States playing a role in ceasefire negotiations. Many Indians are asking, why did another country announce that India’s armed forces would cease hostilities with Pakistan? Prime Minister Narendra Modi must respond and clarify India’s position on the issue, to avoid the global “re-hyphenation” of India-Pakistan in regional politics.

About the author

Rushali Saha

Rushali Saha serves as the Asia Desk Team Lead at Horizon Intelligence, a Belgium-based threat intelligence firm, and is an independent researcher specialising in Indo-Pacific geopolitics.

Topics

India Pakistan