China is equivocal about North Korea in the Kim Jong-un era. In security matters, it prioritises North Korea's continued existence (or at least stability) above all else, and is willing to cooperate with North Korea on measures that will solidify stability. This prioritization comes at the cost of overall leverage over North Korea’s actions and policies, although China continues to use its position to exercise displeasure in smaller ways. At the same time, China’s government and business leaders are divided over what else to do, particularly in the economic sphere. China greatly desires North Korea to follow it along the path of reform and opening up, but Chinese businesses are reluctant to invest in North Korea, and Chinese government officials are ambivalent about North Korean activities in China itself. What are the current expectations of DPRK leadership from the PRC, and how likely is it that North Korea will be doing everything to please China in the future? These and other questions will be addressed by Dr Leonid Petrov and Dr Justin Hastings from the University of Sydney.
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