A bridge too far: Thucydides Trap and the limits of middle powers

The Indo-Pacific is the battleground of rivalry between China, a rising power, and the current hegemon, the US. It is uncertain how this rivalry will play out. However, as Graham Allison points out in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, a deadly pattern of structural stress takes shape when a rising power challenges the current one. The likely consequences will be violence, escalating into an all-out war.

Is war between China and the US, therefore, inevitable? Can middle powers play a part in pulling China and the US away from the Thucydides Trap?

The road to war?

Signs of structural stress in the Indo-Pacific security system are clear. This is partly driven by China’s efforts to supplant Washington’s security role and influence in Southeast Asia through a two-pronged strategy: influencing regional states to reduce their dependence on the US for security and developing capabilities to challenge American dominance in the military sphere.

A Southeast Asian official involved in the talks privately shared that China is attempting to exclude the US from the region by proposing that the COC agreement should include a requirement for ASEAN members not to involve the US in any joint military exercises in the contested waters.

Since the end of the Second World War, the US has been a linchpin of security in Southeast Asia. It has military alliances with the Philippines and Thailand and access to military bases in Singapore. It is a preferred exercise partner for many.

China has actively sought to pull Southeast Asian states away from the US. An example is Beijing’s tactic in negotiating the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC). A Southeast Asian official involved in the talks privately shared that China is attempting to exclude the US from the region by proposing that the COC agreement should include a requirement for ASEAN members not to involve the US in any joint military exercises in the contested waters.

The Chinese are also directly challenging the Americans’ military dominance. They built the largest navy in the world in terms of numbers and have taken measures to blunt the American military advantage. The deployment of DF21 missiles, dubbed the carrier killer, is an example of the latter.

The US has reviewed its strategy and force deployment across the Indo-Pacific to counter China. In Southeast Asia, the Americans strengthened the Philippines’ military capabilities to deal with Chinese threats in the South China Sea while gaining access to more Filipino military bases.

... middle powers could set the norms, standards, or institutions that may influence the two great powers to avoid the Thucydides Trap.

Role of middle powers

However, as Allison points out, war is not inevitable. This is where middle powers could set the norms, standards, or institutions that may influence the two great powers to avoid the Thucydides Trap.

Great powers need middle powers to advance their interests and win influence; therefore, the two parties must interact. Middle powers could leverage these interactions to shape the great powers’ norms and standards in favour of conflict avoidance. For example, Australia and Indonesia have “2+2” dialogues involving their defence and foreign minister and their counterparts from the US and China, respectively.

Multilateral institutions or forums comprising middle powers could also act as facilitators, enabling China and the US to interact and converse with each other to avoid conflicts. Take the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), for example. Singapore hosts the annual security forum, which facilitates interactions between defence officials from the US and China at a time when their direct bilateral communications were not working optimally.

However, since middle powers such as Australia, Japan and South Korea are members of US-led minilateral defence arrangements that Beijing perceives as a threat, China is less likely to see them as honest and unbiased actors to act as facilitators.

A bridge too far

While middle powers could potentially influence the US and China to avoid the Thucydides Trap, this expectation could be a bridge too far.

First is the issue of trust, or the lack of it. For middle powers to effectively play a middleman role and facilitate engagements between the US and China, they must be perceived as unbiased actors. However, since middle powers such as Australia, Japan and South Korea are members of US-led minilateral defence arrangements that Beijing perceives as a threat, China is less likely to see them as honest and unbiased actors to act as facilitators.

Middle powers in Southeast Asia have the same challenges. China has territorial disputes with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. At the same time, Singapore is a close US defence partner. Given its internal political instability, Thailand may not have the appetite to be a peace broker for the great powers.

Second, great powers will likely not adhere to the norms, standards or institutions the middle powers advocate if these are perceived to challenge their interests. For instance, China views the SLD suspiciously. In 2014, its representative at the SLD Lieutenant-General Wang Guanzhong accused the US and Japan of coordinating their criticisms towards China. Two years ago, a Chinese official suggested that the SLD served the interests of the US and its allies.

As a result, China’s Beijing Xiangshan Forum acts as an alternative to the SLD as a security forum in the Indo-Pacific. However, the Beijing-run forum is shunned by many Western countries or attended by low-level delegations, putting a question mark on its effectiveness in contributing to regional stability.

In Washington, there is a bipartisan position that China is a threat, as reflected in government documents issued by the Trump and Biden administrations. Thus, the outcome of the US election in November of this year may not substantially change Washington’s perceptions of China.

The measures China and the US take to defend their interests paint a challenging future in the Indo-Pacific and shrink the space for middle powers to influence China...

Furthermore, the plethora of US-led minilateral defence arrangements across the Indo-Pacific further align many middle powers with the US against China — AUKUS (with Australia and the UK), “Squad” (with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines), and JAPHUS (with Japan and the Philippines) are some examples. Japan and South Korea are working with the US in Northeast Asia to establish the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework.

The measures China and the US take to defend their interests paint a challenging future in the Indo-Pacific and shrink the space for middle powers to influence China and the US to walk away from the Thucydides Trap. The Chinese military buildup, US-led minilateral defence arrangements and the lack of trust in multilateral security institutions — can be the powder kegs leading the Indo-Pacific into a full-blown military conflict.