Hugh White wants Australia to oppose a 'pre-emptive' attack but Australia's complicity may begin sooner than imagined.

Attitudes about friend or foe shift dramatically when countries work together on a serious security problem.

Many Republicans privately resent US President Trump for passing responsibility on the Iran deal to Congress.

China’s neighbours are not passive dominoes or feckless pawns in a US-China power contest.

Bringing in other states with significant regional interests, such as the UK, may help the quadrilateral security dialogue.

Organising a loose strategic coalition might upset Beijing, but that's no reason not to forge ahead.

The President appears to be learning that whatever leverage the US has with China is derivative of our alliances and partnerships in the region.

If war on the Korean Peninsula does eventuate, the US should see it as an opportunity to forge a better peace.

Tillerson’s speech also signaled a significant hardening of US attitudes towards China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Australia would prefer the US to focus on the Indo-Pacific rather than become further embroiled in the Middle East. We may well be disappointed.

In a choice between US isolationism and exceptionalism, it’s the latter that Americans hold dear.

US threats are not seen as credible and are unlikely to work on Pakistan in the future.

I understand the US Marine commander in the Pacific is willing to allow MRF-D to serve under Australian command if the operational need arises.

On Pakistan, Trump has said out loud what has until now been largely debated and threatened in private.

If Beijing expects the Trump Administration to go soft on China following Bannon's dismissal, it's going to be disappointed.

Harvard University scholar Graham Allison talks about his new book on US-China relations.

China's leaders would very reluctantly back down if they were truly convinced that the alternative was war with America. But how would the US convince them of that?

The obvious wrinkle in the PM’s ANZUS pledge is what happens if the US strikes first and North Korea retaliates by attacking South Korea.

Each month – each week – brings new and alarming developments in US-Russian relations. The only question is: how much worse can things get?

The US doesn’t have to be willing to blockade Scarborough Reef to stop China from building a military base there.

It looks as though the United States is going back to its position during negotiations on UNCLOS, and setting aside the carefully balanced nature of the EEZ regime.

For Beijing, armed drone exports are good business in more ways than one.

It is possible to both condemn China’s political system, but also accept it as an incipient great power with legitimate security concerns.

Beijing is not just trying to take control of an important body of water. It is trying to take control of East Asia and hopes to use the South China Sea dispute to do that.

Those of us on the line would appreciate some tangible help in holding back the world’s worst nuclear problem; not just empty words and slogans.

'They are casting about, just like we would have done if we had won, for a potential solution to a wicked problem.'

Some of the most important progress in US-India relations in recent years has been on Indo-Pacific issues.

The US Commander of the United Nations Command in South Korea, General Brooks, wants to 'revitalise' it.

By overstating the importance of American involvement in the past, we over-emphasise the risks of American absence tomorrow.

There is a whiff of blind faith being employed by some Australian ministers in their responses to these kinds of American sentiments.

Some argue Australia should not rest easy since it might get the European treatment when the President shows up. Could be, but I doubt it.

Should Australia join this treaty, it would need to end its claimed reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.

Our contribution should meet the need expressed by the commander, stay for as long as is necessary, and contribute to military and political success.

America’s alliances are not much of an asset at all in managing relations with China. Indeed they are in many ways a net liability, because the benefits they offer are offset by the costs they impose.

Regardless of whether Australian forces are enlisted in any anti-Iran campaign, there is a risk that our troops, aircraft or ships in the Middle East may find themselves targeted in any Iranian retaliation.

President Trump and his nominee to head the EPA face fierce opposition, both from within the EPA and from environmental groups skilled in the activist tactic of 'lawfare'.

This year it is 25 years since Francis Fukuyama published The End of History and the Last Man.

Obama leaves office enjoying unusually high approval ratings while simultaneously fearing the wholesale destruction of his legacy.

More concerning than an America focussed on financial return is one erratic in its approach to the world.

The probability of intense conflict that may involve Australia is as high as it has been since 1945, and probably higher.

Hard thinking is needed, free of the emotional trammels that so often accompany the alliance debate.

The call suggests Trump finds it odd the Chinese Communist Party would pre-determine which fellow democratically elected leaders he should shun.

This two-part series examines how US sanctions have kept Putin's empire building in check.

Trump’s foreign policy is not a threat to America’s place in the world, but it might be a threat to the current establishment.

As Trump himself has conceded, it would be hard to change or walk away from on a deal that has been approved in a Security Council resolution.

Trump was at times boastful, when talking about his business success, and at times humble: ‘I am just a messenger’. People clapped and waved their signs but he wasn’t serious and they didn’t believe it.

The stakes in Syria remain incredibly high.