Our complicated relationship with China and the implications of President Trump for Australia have eclipsed thoughtful reflection on the Australia-Japan relationship.
Australia should develop a more robust and distinct preventing violent extremism (PVE) program that aims to support the existing capacities of - or mobilises - communities and individuals.
It is one thing to recognise the realities of current sensibilities; quite another to let them mask the more substantial arguments required to win a greater measure of popular support than in 1999.
There are two broad narratives in the international coverage of Australia. First, the country is no longer a beacon for human rights. Second, its politics are parochial and often paralysing,
It looks as though the United States is going back to its position during negotiations on UNCLOS, and setting aside the carefully balanced nature of the EEZ regime.
It was always part of the Trump agenda to do something about the North American Free Trade Agreement (‘one of the worst deals ever’) covering the US, Canada and Mexico: the outcome is renegotiation rather than the threatened termination.
Australia may prove to be the test case for a policy solution that has far reaching consequences for privacy, technological development and the future of law enforcement operations.
The view that India is reluctant to engage Australia in a multilateral naval setting because it is wary of Canberra’s strategic credentials lacks merit.
The travails of our major parties are directly impacting our foreign policy. The parties are desperate for funds, which makes them vulnerable to entreaties from wealthy foreign donors.
In the late 1970s, when deciding how to respond to asylum seekers arriving by boat, the government said Australia had a commitment to provide 'sanctuary to genuine refugees within its territory'.
Jokowi’s main interest is economic cooperation. As he joked in Sydney: 'Let’s talk more about economics, I don’t want to talk a lot about politics – it gives me a headache'.