Myanmar, explained.
Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing enters a hall in the Kremlin for a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, 18 August 2026 (Alexander Zemlianichenko/Getty Images)
The regional body is in the uncomfortable position of being undermined by its own member-states.
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ASEAN is dropping the ball on MyanmarASEAN is dropping the ball on Myanmar
By all appearances, Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has had a banner diplomatic year, chalking up a slew of high-profile visits to neighbouring states including China, India, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam. In doing so, he has effectively outmanoeuvred the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which did not recognise the results of the military’s fraudulent elections in January and which has barred high-level representatives from Myanmar from attending its summits.
Canberra needs to prepare for further rapid changes to Myanmar’s international status – rather than just react to first movers.
Now ASEAN appears to have lost control over the diplomatic process. In early October, Reuters revealed (Opens in new window) that the United States held secret talks with the Myanmar government in Tokyo in June, paving the way for a meeting between senior US officials and Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw in September. According to Reuters, US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Michael Vance led the delegation’s visit to Naypyidaw with the ostensible aim of releasing detained American businessman Adam Castillo.
The visit served as convenient pretext for an engagement which the Trump administration had been mulling for some time. Ironically, Castillo had previously pitched (Opens in new window) the administration on potential access to Myanmar’s vast reserves of rare earths, which are critical to advanced technologies (Opens in new window) such as electric vehicles, solar panels, jet engines, and guided missiles. The problem is that Myanmar’s military does not control (Opens in new window) the territory where the rare earths lie, and China controls the supply chains of production.
China has been a key proponent of Min Aung Hlaing’s government, backing the military’s elections and pressuring (Opens in new window) ethnic armed groups along the border in northern Myanmar to enter ceasefire negotiations with the armed forces. Beijing’s influence decisively tilted the balance of power (Opens in new window) in the military’s favour following significant losses (Opens in new window) to resistance forces in late 2023.
Not to be outdone by recent US overtures to Naypyidaw, a Chinese delegation led by Peng Xiubin, director‑general of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department, held a meeting (Opens in new window) in Myanmar in October with nine political parties, including the military’s proxy the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and eight other parties that the junta permitted to contest the 2025 election. Discussions focused on understanding public perception of China and strengthening the bilateral relationship.
Myanmar has been far from a priority in Washington since the 2021 military coup, which ended a decade of democratic reforms and saw the United States downgrade its diplomatic representation following Ambassador Thomas Vajda’s (Opens in new window) departure in 2022. But with the Trump administration’s openness to a new approach, great power competition is once again alive and well in Myanmar.
ASEAN has maintained (Opens in new window) that its Five Point Consensus is the preferred diplomatic path to resolve the crisis in Myanmar and bring Naypyidaw back into the fold. The plan, agreed in a special summit in 2021, calls for (Opens in new window) an end to violence, dialogue among all parties, mediation by a special envoy, humanitarian assistance, and a visit by that envoy to meet all parties. Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teresa Lazaro, the current special envoy for Myanmar, has insisted (Opens in new window) that Myanmar’s return to full participation in ASEAN’s meetings is “still far off.”
When Thailand takes up the ASEAN chairmanship in 2028, Bangkok is certain to advocate full normalisation of Myanmar’s membership.
But with Min Aung Hlaing’s recent spate of state visits to individual ASEAN member states, the bloc’s consensus-based position may be irrelevant. Indeed, the former general has travelled to five of the group’s 11 members this year alone, with reports (Opens in new window) that he may soon make trips to Indonesia and Brunei as well.
As regional leaders and great powers rush to shore up influence with the erstwhile pariah state, ASEAN finds itself in the uncomfortable position of being hung out to dry by its own members. The situation is particularly vexing for Singapore, which will take over the ASEAN chairmanship from the Philippines next month. Naturally, Singapore would rather focus on other pressing issues, such as setting the AI safety standards (Opens in new window) of the 21st century and advancing regional economic integration (Opens in new window) in the face of a shifting global order.
As chair, Singapore is likely to preserve the status quo for one more year, precluding Myanmar’s full participation in ASEAN for the time being. However, when Thailand takes up the chairmanship in 2028, Bangkok is certain to advocate full normalisation of Myanmar’s membership.
Canberra needs to prepare for further rapid changes to Myanmar’s international status – rather than just react to first movers. With Washington, Beijing, New Delhi and Moscow all courting Naypyidaw, and ASEAN’s leverage rapidly fading, Australian policymakers should consult regional partners and Washington to gauge where their Myanmar policies are heading.
At the same time, Canberra should be realistic about the likelihood of engagement bearing fruit. As long as Min Aung Hlaing and the generals are in power, we are unlikely to see meaningful reforms in Myanmar.
About the author
Hunter Marston
Dr Hunter Marston is the Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute and Project Lead for the Asia Power Index.
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