Ukraine’s bold naval campaign against Russia in the Black Sea offers crucial lessons for Australia. Despite facing a far superior navy, Ukraine has used innovative tactics, rapid adaptation and modern technology to disrupt Russian operations in the Black Sea.
Although Australia's geography differs from that of Ukraine, the lessons from Ukraine's sea-denial campaign are highly relevant.
For Australia, a nation reliant on the sea for both trade and security, these insights are invaluable. However, it’s crucial that we focus on learning the right lessons and applying them effectively to our unique maritime environment. Ukraine’s ability to challenge a dominant naval power in a contested sea demonstrates that, with the right strategy and capabilities, Australia can safeguard its own maritime interests.
Sea denial
Ukraine has implemented a highly successful strategy of sea denial, the ability to deny an adversary’s maritime freedom of manoeuvre. Although Australia’s geography differs from that of Ukraine, the lessons from Ukraine’s sea-denial campaign are highly relevant.
Ukraine has used its geography to maximum effect, leveraging the semi-enclosed nature of the Black Sea to disrupt Russian naval operations. For Australia, strategic chokepoints such as the Sunda and Lombok Straits hold similar importance. In any regional conflict, denying access to these waterways would significantly hinder adversary movement. China is heavily reliant on key chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait. By developing a deployable capability, Australia could apply the lessons from Ukraine’s sea denial strategy to these critical areas.
By targeting Russia’s maritime capabilities at greater than 300 nautical miles, Ukraine has dramatically extended the range that its land-based forces can influence Russian maritime operations. Uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and surface vessels (USVs), as well as cruise missiles, have meant that a force operating from the land can successfully attack naval forces at sea well beyond traditional coastal boundaries.
Australia can draw a parallel by accelerating the acquisition of the Army’s land-based maritime strike missile capabilities. However, Ukraine’s example also highlights the need for Australia to broaden its focus beyond land-based systems. Australia has a strong capacity to build small craft and UAVs, and mobilising this capability to develop armed USVs and UAVs for rapid deployment in chokepoint protection could significantly enhance the ADF’s capabilities.
Projecting Australian power
Australia’s geography differs from Ukraine’s in a key way: our seas are not enclosed. If Australia’s maritime domain becomes contested, sea denial alone will not be enough. Australia’s dependence on seaborne supply, the provision of fuel, ammunition and more across the seas, will require Australia to have a broader maritime strategy than that enacted by Ukraine in the Black Sea.
The vast coastline and open ocean environment require a strategy that includes limited sea control and power projection, with the resources to carry out these tasks. This means that, in addition to investing in maritime strike capabilities for coastal and chokepoint protection, Australia must maintain traditional assets for sea and air control far from its shores – submarines, warships, replenishment vessels, and aviation assets.
Ukraine has dramatically extended the range that its land-based forces can influence Russian maritime operations.
A further lesson from the Black Sea can be drawn from the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva, despite that vessel’s technological superiority. The Moskva was sunk by two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles – a threat which the cruiser, designed for anti-air warfare, should have easily countered. However, poor crew preparedness and maintenance failures in its defence systems resulted in defeat to a relatively simple threat. This highlights a critical point: ship readiness and posture can determine the outcome of naval engagements.
For Australia, this is a reminder that having a well-prepared, flexible fleet is just as important as having the latest technologies. Ships must be ready to respond quickly, with crews trained for high-intensity operations. Agility, rather than sheer size, will be key to Australia’s naval effectiveness in any conflict.
Ukraine’s employment of USVs has been significant but USVs can be defeated, as we have also seen in the Black Sea. This balance between capability and counter-capability is essential in modern naval warfare. Australia must ensure its maritime forces strike this balance effectively. Offensive capabilities should be developed alongside defensive measures, including electronic warfare systems, enhanced sensor networks, and robust ship survivability. The ability to rapidly counter evolving threats, whilst also embracing new capabilities such as USVs for offensive operations, will be key.
Ukraine’s effective sea denial strategy in the Black Sea offers a masterclass in how a smaller, determined naval force can challenge a much larger one. For Australia, these lessons are clear. Sea denial in key chokepoints, enhanced ship posture and preparedness, a balance between offensive and defensive capabilities, rapid adaptation, and the protection of trade and ports are all essential to safeguarding national interests.
However, Australia’s vast maritime geography also requires a strategy that goes beyond sea denial. Should its maritime domain become contested, Australia must be ready to achieve limited sea control and project power over vast distances. This will require an adaptable, highly capable navy, prepared for the full spectrum of naval warfare in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.
