Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto was in China last week, his second visit since winning the Indonesian election. What made this visit so surprising was the joint statement released after the meeting. Among the long list of agreements and cooperation initiatives, there was a paragraph agreeing to joint development in areas of the South China Sea where Beijing and Jakarta have overlapping claims. This is a significant statement which betrays Indonesia’s South China Sea policy over past decades.
By this statement, Indonesia appears to be the first ASEAN member-state to implicitly recognise Beijing’s “nine-dash line” – a set of lines on Chinese maps reflecting Beijing’s claims to areas of the South China Sea - and therefore the first ASEAN country to fall into China’s nine-dash line trap. This is a contradictory and reckless policy, dangerous for Indonesia and for the region.
The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has now released a vague statement clarifying that Indonesia still does not recognise China's nine-dash line. However, this contradicts the joint statement and was released unilaterally, while the joint statement was made by Indonesia and China together, so it is possible that China may continue to hold the interpretation presented in the earlier statement.
Ever since China introduced the nine-dash line, Indonesia has firmly rejected it, as it overlaps with Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, a legitimate claim under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The 2016 South China Sea Tribunal ruling made it clear that China’s nine-dash line claim has no basis under international law. Recognising the claim thus means Indonesia has assented to something that is illegal under international law. Even worse, Indonesia is willing to share its sovereign rights to explore and exploit fisheries and oil with the country making this claim.
By recognising the overlapping claim with China, Indonesia has an obligation to negotiate a maritime boundary. Before this recognition, Indonesia had maritime boundaries with ten states: Australia, Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Palau, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and India. Geographically, all these countries neighbour Indonesia, meaning that under UNCLOS, Indonesia has a right to negotiate a maritime boundary delimitation either for an exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, or territorial waters.
However, considering China is located far beyond the 200nm-exclusive economic zone and the 350nm-continental shelf, there is no way Indonesia should negotiate a maritime boundary delimitation with China. This is a huge loss for Indonesia’s ability to manage its natural resources.
Recognition of China’s nine-dash line claim also has implications for the ongoing negotiation of the ASEAN-China South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC). During negotiations for the CoC, Indonesia has made it clear that all claims in the CoC should be based on a legitimate claim under UNCLOS. Therefore, the recent statement seems to betray Indonesia’s own position, upheld by the Foreign Ministry for many years.
This is a contradictory and reckless policy, dangerous for Indonesia and for the region.
So, this statement has significant implications for negotiation of the CoC, and exposes that ASEAN countries do not have a unified position in the negotiations with Beijing. Other ASEAN claimant states may feel betrayed by Indonesia’s recognition of the nine-dash line claim, which they have firmly and jointly rejected up to this point.
Lastly, this statement may also have implications for the recent Indonesia-Vietnam EEZ delimitation agreement, which has not yet been ratified by the Indonesian parliament. In 2022, Indonesia and Vietnam concluded a 12-year negotiation. The agreement was considered significant because it showed that ASEAN states are capable of settling their overlapping maritime boundary disputes through peaceful negotiations. Moreover, the agreement showed clearly that both Indonesia and Vietnam do not recognise China’s nine-dash-line claim, despite protests from Beijing after it was concluded.
Indonesia’s recognition of China’s overlapping claim contradicts the Indonesia-Vietnam EEZ agreement. Indonesia has yet to ratify the agreement, and the recent statement recognising China’s overlapping claim now creates uncertainty around ratification.
The joint statement between Indonesia and China has betrayed Indonesia’s national interest and seems to be a huge win for Beijing. It is consequential for Indonesia’s sovereign rights to use resources in its EEZ and continental shelf, and has significantly changed the political constellation and solidarity of ASEAN claimant states in the South China Sea.
This article is part of the Blue Security project led by La Trobe Asia, University of Western Australia Defence and Security Institute, Griffith Asia Institute, United States Studies Centre, UNSW Canberra and the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy and Defence Dialogue (AP4D). Views expressed are solely of its author/s and not representative of the Maritime Exchange, the Australian Government, or the collaboration partner country government.
