This article also appears in a collection of essays, Harris v Trump, written by Lowy Institute experts on the implications for Australia of the US presidential election.
During the recent US presidential debate, moderator David Muir posed the following question to the two candidates: “I want to ask you a very simple question tonight. Do you want Ukraine to win this war?”
Former president Donald Trump failed to provide a yes or no answer. He was criticised for this by Vice President Kamala Harris during the debate and by commentators in the wake of the event.
But while Harris provided a long-winded answer to the question, she too failed to say yes or no.
This is illustrative not only of the respective candidates’ views but of the US policy for Ukraine. It is not really clear that the United States wants Ukraine to win the war. While America obviously supports Ukraine, its primary strategic objective appears to be to avoid war with Russia. Avoiding World War III is a topic frequently raised by President Joe Biden.
After 33 months of war, there is still no public US strategy beyond slogans like “as long as it takes” (although a classified strategy was reportedly delivered to Congress recently). And while Ukraine is now briefing US policymakers on a victory plan, it is not clear that this is anything more than a grab bag of military and financial requests.
The only nation that appears to possess a clear strategy, and a viable theory of victory, is Russia.
In her statements on Ukraine during the debate and elsewhere, it is clear that Harris sees the war in Ukraine as a strategic and a moral issue.
Thus, a future President Harris would need to deal with a central problem in America’s support for Ukraine: does it want Ukraine to beat Russia and is it willing to provide the military, diplomatic, and financial resources to do so?
If the answer to this question is yes, it will require the United States and NATO to shift their strategy, and will demand a closer alignment of NATO and Ukrainian strategy to see the war through to victory. It will also require trade-offs in scarce military resources that might be required to confront China, a tougher approach on China’s support for Russia, and a different strategy for dealing with Russian nuclear sabre rattling. Russia will be sure to escalate its campaign of sabotage, misinformation, and general mischief around the world in the wake of such a decision.
Alternatively, Harris might decide to continue the current course of the war. The Ukrainians believe this probably dooms them to a slow strangulation as Russia bleeds Ukraine of people and resources.
There are some in the US policy debate and in US Congress who believe that this would not be catastrophic for US interests. In her statements on Ukraine during the debate and elsewhere, it is clear that Harris sees the war in Ukraine as a strategic and a moral issue. But whether she can convince more members of Congress of this, and gain the funding to continue support for Ukraine, remains to be seen. Even if she wanted to pursue a goal of Ukrainian victory, she must deal with Congress on a range of issues, and funding domestic priorities or confronting China might trump funding Ukraine.
As the war in Ukraine heads towards three years since the large-scale Russian invasion, and nearly 11 years of conflict overall, NATO, other US allies, and Ukraine have no clear view of US policy and support after the first week of November. Unfortunately, in war, the absence of strategy and long-term thinking is fatal. A Harris administration will have little time to decide whether it really wants Ukraine to defeat Russia. Its decision will have profound consequences for the future of Ukraine and for America’s stature and global influence.
