As Malaysia approaches its 2025 ASEAN chairmanship, it brings with it the weight of a relatively successful, albeit ongoing, democratic transition. At a time and in a region where democratic backsliding is widespread, Malaysia’s transition since 2018 from entrenched dominant-party rule to a competitive, multi-party democracy is significant. For both Southeast Asia and the Muslim-majority world, Malaysia’s democratisation offers a new hope.
No single party or power broker holds absolute power after the 2022 general election. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim completes his second year in power this month, longer than his past three predecessors whose tenures were prematurely ended, with no immediate challenger on sight.
These developments are opportunities for Malaysia and international partners such as Australia to forge stronger ties and new strategic initiatives, from enhancing economic cooperation to advancing democratic agenda and maritime security in our region.
Southeast Asia hasn’t had a successful democratic transition since Indonesia’s Reformasi nearly three decades ago. There were hopes in Myanmar in the mid-2010s where a civilian government was elected and Aung San Suu Kyi became the state counsellor. But the partial transition did not last as the junta retook power in 2021 and Suu Kyi once again was arrested. Given the absence of military in Malaysian politics, the democratic transition is less vulnerable to a coup.
In Thailand, the rise of Future Forward Party (FFP) and youth power was met with repeated suppression. Founded in 2018 by Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit (TJ) as a reformist movement, the FFP and its successors (Move Forward Party and now People’s Party) gained popularity with its criticism of military influence in politics and the use of the lese-majeste law, one of the strictest in the world. Both FFP and MPP were dissolved by the Constitutional Court, despite the latter winning the most seats and votes in 2023 Thai general election. The repeated dissolution of reformist parties reflects the Thai state’s use of judicial means to block opposition voices and stifle democratic progress. In contrast, Malaysia’s judiciary is regaining its credibility as a more independent institution than their Thai counterpart. Former prime minister Najib Razak was found guilty over the 1MDB scandal and sentenced to jail, despite political pressure to free him under three prime ministers.
Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East face too many intractable conflicts – historical occupation, military regimes, absolute monarchies, oil and resource curse, and foreign intervention – that the answers on the compatibility between Islam and democracy are perhaps to be found elsewhere.
In Indonesia, former president Joko Widodo has gone from political outsider to the patriarch of a new political dynasty. Jokowi all but supported Prabowo Subianto, a former general with a controversial past in Timor Leste, to succeed him. His family members entered key political roles – most glaringly, a judicial ruling by his brother-in-law allowed Jokowi’s son to bypass eligibility requirements and run for vice president. His administration has enacted laws that curb civil liberties, which threatens the country’s vibrant civil society.
Malaysia’s democratic journey also holds particular significance as a Muslim-majority country undergoing democratisation. Following the Arab Spring, Tunisia emerged as a promising democracy and its advocates won the Nobel Peace prize “for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy.”
The chatter about Tunisia as a beacon of democracy for the Muslim world has all but faded today. The country regressed into political and economic turmoil. Its recent 2024 election was marred by banned candidates and a 90% presidential majority reminiscence of Ben Ali-era autocratic “achievements”.
Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East face too many intractable conflicts – historical occupation, military regimes, absolute monarchies, oil and resource curse, and foreign intervention – that the answers on the compatibility between Islam and democracy are perhaps to be found elsewhere. Malaysia presents a unique setting to probe critical questions about the role of Muslim democrats in addressing contemporary challenges to democratisation.
As the country navigates the complexities of a plural society, it faces pressures from resurgent political Islam and ethnoreligious nationalism that threaten democratic ideals, which is not only evident in Malaysia but also mirrored in various global contexts such as Christian nationalism in the United States, Hindu nationalism in India, and Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar.
The ability of Malaysia’s Muslim democrats to engage with these issues is essential for the consolidation of our democracy. Their attempts to grapple these questions (or lack thereof) will be telling for the trajectories of democracy in Malaysia and the broader Muslim world.
Anwar’s Malaysia stands at a critical juncture in world history, with the opportunity to assert itself as a leader to shape democratic agenda in Southeast Asia and the Muslim world. Now is the time to deepen democratisation, consolidate hard-won gains, implement robust institutional and electoral reforms, organise dialogues, construct progressive narratives, incentivise critical discourse, while confronting threats from ethnoreligious nationalism. Given democratic regression elsewhere, it is crucial to sustain hard-won gains in Malaysia’s democratic progress. Sounds like a lot, but this moment demands it.
