It would be an understatement to say that Philippines President Marcos “Bongbong” Jnr has exceeded American expectations.
Under Marcos, the Philippines has resumed patrols with security partners in the South China Sea and revived and expanded the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Signed in 2014 but stymied under Marcos’ predecessor Rodrigo Duterte – who also suspended joint patrols and flirted with tearing up foundational aspects of the alliance – EDCA grants the US military access to nine sites adjoining the South China Sea and waters near Taiwan.
With Sara Duterte likely to seriously consider a presidential bid in 2028, it is conceivable that there will be another pivot in Manila’s foreign policy.
The Philippines has also signed a historically unprecedented military access agreement with Japan, and is arguably the only nation in ASEAN to offer unqualified public support for both the Quad and AUKUS. Strategic pundits now speak of a “Squad” comprising Japan, the United States, Australia and Philippines.
Beijing would have reason to be disappointed. China assiduously cultivated the Marcos family in their home province of Ilocos Norte, using a model that was later rolled out in the Duterte clan’s fiefdom in Davao.
Marcos’ early comments would have been mellifluous to Beijing’s ears. Before assuming power, Marcos pledged to negotiate a deal with China on maritime disputes, warning “if you let the US come in, you make China your enemy”.
There was also a lingering sense in the Marcos family that it had been “betrayed” by the United States. Marcos Jr was for decades unable travel to the United States without risking arrest on contempt charges related to a class action brought by victims of his father’s regime.
Another factor portending against a more pro-US approach was Marcos’ electoral alliance with Sara Duterte – the daughter of his predecessor and his Vice President, who resigned her cabinet positions in June.* Although independent minded (she defied her father by joining Marcos’ ticket) and less unabashedly pro-Beijing, Sara Duterte has mostly avoided any criticism of China’s progressively more truculent maritime behaviour.
There are various plausible explanations for Marcos’ volte-face.
The re-embrace of the US alliance has been popular with the public, especially insofar as it has facilitated a more assertive stance on maritime disputes.
By reinvigorating the US alliance, Marcos may plausibly have hoped to empower and cultivate the loyalty of the more pro-US elements of the military – which had earlier worked behind the scenes to stymie Duterte’s efforts to jettison the alliance.
The political neutrality of security forces is not something to be taken for granted in a country which has seen a litany of alleged coup plots in recent decades. Marcos would have an intimate understanding of this dynamic, given the military’s role in helping end his father's dictatorship.
Early on in his term, Marcos was reportedly exercised by fears that Duterte loyalists had entrenched themselves in both the police and military. Marcos’ refusal of Sara Duterte’s request to be defence minister was instructive on this point.
As well as helping to cultivate the military, the re-embrace of the US alliance has been popular with the public, especially insofar as it has facilitated a more assertive stance on maritime disputes.
Duterte’s initial obeisance to Beijing failed to guarantee fishing rights or secure any joint oil and gas development deals. Chinese investment fell well short of anticipated numbers, though Chinese lending did increase markedly.
By contrast, the Biden administration has made no secret of its efforts to up its economic game in the Philippines. The centrepiece is the Presidential Trade and Investment Mission and the so far mostly conceptual US$100 billion Luzon Economic Corridor, established under the auspices of the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure. As an additional blandishment, the United States last month announced an additional US$500 million in military aid.
Marked differences on foreign policy are unlikely to have played a dispositive role in fracturing the Duterte-Marcos alliance, which is better explained by Duterte Snr’s pre-existing dislike of Marcos, intra-elite competition for state resources and Marcos’ flirtation with a plan to change the Constitution to bypass presidential term limits.
Foreign policy has nonetheless served as a vector for political competition. Marcos has excoriated Duterte snr for signing a “secret” deal with China on the South China Sea. Marcos’ allies in parliament pointedly re-directed funds previously controlled by Sara Duterte to the country’s coast guard.
For his part, Duterte snr hyperbolically claimed that the United States is seeking to station nuclear weapons at EDCA sites, and that the Philippines risks becoming a “graveyard”.
Intriguingly, in a sign that the Marcos’ are also struggling to maintain a united front, Bongbong’s sister Imee Marcos has made similarly vociferous claims about the risks posed by EDCA. The burgeoning alliance between Imee Marcos and Sara Duterte epitomises the fluidity of elite Filipino politics.
With Sara Duterte likely to seriously consider a presidential bid in 2028, it is conceivable that there will be another pivot in Manila’s foreign policy.
The tendency for successive administrations to oscillate between Beijing and Washington is not a new dynamic in Filipino politics. However, past divergences have generally not been quite as pronounced and took place in a much less polarised international environment. For the US, alliance planning and the coherence of its overall strategy in maritime Southeast Asia has become considerably more fraught.
* This article was corrected to clarify that Sara Duterte resigned her cabinet roles, not as vice president.
