In two weeks, Indonesia’s Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto will officially take over the presidency. In leading the vast archipelago through the treacherous regional waters of great power rivalry between the United States and China, there is a widely held argument that he will focus on domestic stability and defend Indonesia’s territorial integrity.
Military developments in the Natuna Islands have received considerable attention from analysts and foreign powers as an example supportive of the idea that Jakarta’s main security concern (and Prabowo’s, too) is China.
Chinese warships and fishing vessels have indeed encroached within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands, which sit at the southern end of the South China Sea. Between January and June 2023, Chinese coast guard vessels were deployed six times in these waters.
The Indonesian military (TNI) has responded by developing new bases on Natuna Islands, including port facilities and runways for naval and air missions.
However, a broader analysis of Indonesia’s overall defence posture suggests an alternative view of Prabowo’s security priorities as he takes the reins.
A key public document presented in Bahasa Indonesia is one insight. This document, which Indonesian officials pointed me to, was issued in 2021 by the Indonesian Defence ministry two years after Prabowo was appointed Defence Minister. Titled “Presidential Regulations of the Republic of Indonesia No 8 Year 2021,” it outlined Indonesia’s security concerns and proposed defence upgrades to address them.
While the document mentions the contemporary South China Sea disputes, tension on the Korean Peninsula, and China-Taiwan relations as potential threats to Indonesia’s security, a more intriguing point is historical – the description of the foreign military intervention in 1999 in Timor-Leste, which the document identified as the factor driving the separation of the territory from Indonesia.
The document reinforces the fear of foreign interference in domestic Indonesian affairs, and points to the potential in Aceh and West Papua. Although the insurgency in Aceh ended nearly 20 years ago, the document warns that Indonesia’s security establishment should monitor any foreign interference that could lead to Indonesia losing the province, with reference to Timor-Leste as an example. The long-running separatist movement in Papua, meanwhile, also continues.
Suspicions persist in the Indonesian security community that US Marines in Darwin, backed by Australia, could intervene on the side of the West Papuan insurgents
To defend Indonesia’s territorial integrity, the document proposes upgrading five military bases with coastal radar and long-range cameras, and integrated capabilities for the various branches of the TNI to operate seamlessly.
The location of these bases illustrates a perception from Prabowo and the Indonesian security establishment that the main threat to Indonesia’s territorial integrity will likely be around West Papua. Four of the bases are on the northern and southern approaches to West Papua. Two face Australia. Concern about China is given less emphasis.
Formative views of Indonesian security, including for Prabowo and many officials, have been shaped by the experience in the late 1990s surrounding the independence of Timor-Leste. Suspicions persist in the Indonesian security community that US Marines in Darwin, backed by Australia, could intervene on the side of the West Papuan insurgents, which may lead to the province’s separation from Indonesia in the future.
Context is important to understand these views. The Cold War rivalry played out in Indonesia, demonstrated with the capture of a CIA operative in 1958 and the military support provided by the Americans to Indonesian rebels in the early years of Indonesia’s independence. This historical evidence is consistently raised by Indonesian officials when asked about their perceptions of America. As one senior Indonesian diplomat once explained it to me, “China did not try to break Indonesia apart, but the US did”.
Prabowo’s personal experience with Australia and the United States likely further coloured his perceptions of these two countries. He was barred from entering the US and Australia until recent years. He could not even attend his son’s graduation in Boston in 2000. Furthermore, Washington imposed an arms embargo on Indonesia for six years until 2005, which had an impact on how the TNI acquired new weapon systems.
A trust deficit persists on the part of Prabowo and some elements of the Indonesian defence community towards Australia and the United States. As a result, Indonesians see a need to diversify the sources of weapon systems, even at a cost to interoperability. Evidence of spying revealed in US intelligence leaks in the past decade have also left a lingering bitterness that colours Indonesian views of military equipment acquisitions.
Some of this may be a generational challenge, whereby it will take time for Indonesian leaders with experience around foreign military intervention to leave the scene, making way for those who view Washington and Canberra with more friendly eyes. But it would be a mistake to forget the prevalence of present view.
