The Kremlin’s public response to Donald Trump’s election victory has been restrained. But this guarded indifference is disingenuous, and, while there are risks for Russia, the Kremlin will welcome Trump’s return as a positive for Moscow.
Why?
After all, Trump didn’t always live up to expectations in Moscow during his first term. Indeed, while keen to develop warmer relations with Moscow, his administration expanded tough sanctions on Russia (albeit under pressure from Congress and the wider national security establishment).
Moreover, Trump’s capriciousness proved as challenging for Moscow as for the rest of the world. And if the President’s unpredictability was somewhat undirected in his first term, it may become a deliberate ploy in his second, designed to keep allies and adversaries alike off-balance in their dealings with the White House. This is unsettling for Moscow, which traditionally values stability and predictability in its relations with Washington.
Yet, before he even takes office, the simple fact of Trump’s election victory is itself a major win for Moscow.
Domestically, the election confirmed the sharply polarised nature of the American body politic. Indeed, Moscow’s disinformation activities through social media in the lead up to the election reportedly contributed to fomenting anxiety and anger, aggravating discord. Such deep divisions within the country Moscow views as its primary adversary are welcome to the Kremlin.
Internationally, the Kremlin will welcome the likely turbulence and uncertainty Trump will bring for Washington’s relations with America’s allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Trump’s scepticism of alliances and his transactional approach, demanding that America’s allies increase their defence spending to share the burden, will cause renewed strains with NATO and raise questions about the dependability of US security guarantees. Meanwhile, Trump’s threatened imposition of tariffs could spark a trade war with European, and other partners. Such dissension within the Western alliance is grist to Moscow’s mill.
It’s hard to see a Trump administration providing the kind of non-NATO security guarantees that a weakened Ukraine would need to assure its sovereignty longer-term against renewed Russian depredations.
The Kremlin won’t expect the incoming Trump administration to take specific steps to improve relations with Moscow. Yet Trump’s return will likely embolden Vladimir Putin. Trump appears to admire the Russian leader as a winner and strongman. The Kremlin will see Trump’s transactional approach, and desire to cut deals, as an opportunity.
Ukraine has particular reason to be worried. On the campaign trail, Trump declared he would end the war within 24 hours. Exactly how he would do this remains unclear but it’s unlikely to be on terms palatable to Kyiv.
If Putin agrees to negotiations (by no means a certainty), Moscow will take a tough stance. It won’t be content with a ceasefire freezing the conflict and locking in place current front lines. As a minimum, Russia will demand full control of the four regions of Ukraine it has already annexed (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizihya and Kherson, plus Crimea), and that Kyiv eschew its NATO membership ambitions.
Even then, Russia probably wouldn’t see that as the end of the matter. Yet it’s hard to see a Trump administration providing the kind of non-NATO security guarantees that a weakened Ukraine would need to assure its sovereignty longer-term against renewed Russian depredations.
Meanwhile, over the coming months, Russia will intensify its efforts to consolidate the upper hand that it increasingly enjoys on the battlefield in eastern Ukraine, and step up its campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure as winter bites, to strengthen its position ahead of Trump’s return to the Oval Office.
In the Middle East, the Trump administration’s approach will offer both challenges and opportunities for Russia.
Notwithstanding cool personal relations with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Trump administration’s approach to Israel will be broadly indulgent. This could complicate Washington’s relations with Arab partners, creating space for Moscow to strengthen ties further with Saudi Arabia and Gulf states.
Trump will likely take a hard line with Iran over its nuclear program and support for its regional proxies – Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthi. This could push Tehran into greater dependence on Russia (and China). Moscow will certainly take advantage of this, yet won’t go out on a limb for Iran in the event of an Israeli attack. Russia, in any event, shares the West’s apprehensions about Iran gaining a nuclear weapons capability.
More awkward for Moscow would be any confrontation between the Trump administration and an emboldened North Korea. This could potentially draw in Russia, given the mutual defence treaty it signed with Pyongyang earlier this year.
Significantly, Moscow may see further deterioration of US-China relations under the Trump administration as providing it with a welcome opportunity to increase Russia’s value proposition to China – at least politically. This could mitigate Moscow’s uncomfortably stark dependence on China nowadays – a strategic necessity for Russia, given its estrangement from the West.
There are risks for Moscow. If Trump moves decisively to expand American oil and gas output, for example, this could harm Russia’s interests by lowering global prices. Yet, set against the wider damage Moscow expects Trump might do to Washington’s relations with its allies and partners, and disruption to the US-led liberal international order, such risks are tolerable.
Russia will hope that the isolationist and protectionist instincts of the incoming administration, reinforced by a Republican-dominated Congress, in which America-first sentiment is prevalent, will lead the United States to retreat from its global role, and that Trump’s return to power contributes to a weakening of liberal democracy globally.
Bear in mind, though, that whatever happens over the next four years, the underlying causes of Russia–US confrontation won’t go away. It’s not just Ukraine, which is really now a proxy issue. Hostility and conflict with the West have become the defining and legitimising rationale of the Putin regime.
That’s not something susceptible to a quick fix.
