At a meeting of Russia’s Security Council last month, President Vladimir Putin announced proposed changes to the Kremlin’s nuclear doctrine. If implemented, the changes mark a significant departure from the existing doctrine – the Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence – announced in 2020. The move is widely seen as a response to US and UK deliberations as to whether to allow Ukraine to fire conventional Western missiles into Russia. Among the changes, there are three to watch.
The statement has significantly lowered the threshold of nuclear weapon use and has specified some new conditions for potential use.
The first refers to the withdrawal of an absolute negative security assurance as Russia expands its definition of threat to include “aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear power, as their joint attack on Russia”. While the statement does not mention Ukraine, this position is aimed at Kyiv, which is receiving significant military support from the United States and other NATO member states. Various analysts have rightly highlighted that this is not an altogether new position, as Russia alongside other nuclear weapon states had maintained a similar position in the Budapest Memorandum. Likewise, Russia, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom had also added similar caveats in their statements to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) on Negative Security Assurance in reference to the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nonetheless, against the backdrop of Ukraine’s confirmation that it had used US-supplied weapons in the Kursk incursion in August this year, the latest emphasis on this position holds greater dangers.
Secondly, the statement has significantly lowered the threshold of nuclear weapon use and has specified some new conditions for potential use. Russia has retained the right to use nuclear weapons in a conflict since it formally dropped its “No First Use” pledge in 1993. As noted in its previous military doctrines of 2000, 2010 and 2014, Russia refers to the potential use only in response to a nuclear attack or use of conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state. In its 2020 nuclear decree, Moscow added two additional scenarios for potential nuclear use that include “arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies” and an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions”. The new statement has further widened the category to include “massive launch of air and space attack weapons” such as “aeroplanes of strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other aircraft”. This statement seems to be aimed at ongoing deliberations in Washington and London on allowing Ukraine to fire long-range missiles including the Storm Shadows and ATACMS ballistic missiles supplied by the United Kingdom and the United States respectively, into Russian territory.
A successful nuclear deterrence is maintained by three key elements: capability, credibility, and communication.
The third significant shift is the categorical inclusion of Belarus into the fold of Russia’s extended nuclear deterrence. Russia has considered the protection of its allies as one of the highest state priorities, but it did not extend its nuclear umbrella to any state in previous military/nuclear doctrine. This is not a unique practice as the United States already provides extended deterrence to its NATO allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including South Korea, Japan and Australia. In that regard, the United States has placed its nuclear weapons in Türkiye, Germany, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. Russia has also recently deployed some of its tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus despite the criticism, and this new statement with its specific reference to Belarus further cements that relationship and expands the horizon of conflict. By formally integrating Belarus into its nuclear strategy, Russia sends a clear message about its willingness to defend its allies and reinforces the notion that any conflict involving Belarus could escalate rapidly.
Unlike previous remarks, Putin’s most recent statement transcends mere rhetoric. It is likely to precede a formal shift in Russia’s nuclear doctrine. However, its intended impact – to deter further involvement of the United States and other NATO partners in the Ukraine conflict – is questionable. A successful nuclear deterrence is maintained by three key elements: capability, credibility, and communication. In terms of capability, Russia possesses the largest inventory of nuclear weapons in the world. Since the start of the war with Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has upped the nuclear ante multiple times to deter the direct involvement of the United States and the European members of NATO in the conflict. The new statement is another effort to communicate Moscow’s resolve to use its nuclear weapons if provoked. However, many Western analysts see no credibility in Russia’s repeated threats and some have termed it a bluff.
This lack of credibility weakens deterrence on one hand and increases the chance of an inadvertent nuclear crisis on the other. Although the threat of a deliberate nuclear attack may not be imminent, the mere use of nuclear rhetoric with the aim of de-escalating a conflict on favourable terms gives rise to the persistent risk of accidental nuclear exchange. Likewise, the repeated threats and expanded role of nuclear weapons in warfare weaken the norm against nuclear use and further expose the fragility of the global nuclear order.
