A potential return of Donald Trump to the US presidency raises concerns about the future of the Indo-Pacific security architecture, a region where several “minilateral” arrangements have been established and made notable advancements in recent years.
First term Trump foreign policy was marked by unpredictability and internal disarray. Key administration figures such as Rex Tillerson, H.R. McMaster, and Jim Mattis, were often sidelined, as the State Department was hollowed out. Despite initial declarations in key strategy documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS), this inconsistency resulted in the administration's delayed and often mismatched approach toward China and the Indo-Pacific.
Under Trump, there was a disconnect between promises made and actions taken, especially in relation to China. Although there were some efforts to bolster military presence and push for freedom of navigation operations, the administration’s overall approach lacked coherence. A return to Trump’s leadership could similarly derail ongoing efforts to build a cohesive Indo-Pacific security architecture.
The rise of minilateralism
In recent years, Indo-Pacific nations have developed a range of minilateral agreements focused on addressing regional security and technological challenges. These arrangements, such as the Quad and AUKUS, have gradually shifted from primarily diplomatic efforts to more concrete partnerships aimed at building capacity in areas such as cybersecurity, infrastructure, and technology.
The Quad, originally established in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, has evolved into a more formalised grouping concerned with countering China's growing influence. In the last five years the Quad has expanded its focus to include maritime security, cybersecurity, and economic cooperation. Notably, cooperation among Quad members – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – has deepened, particularly in response to aggressive actions by China.
Significant questions about the future of AUKUS – in particular the nuclear-powered submarine program – already exist, and Trump’s capricious approach to governance could further complicate the partnership.
AUKUS, meanwhile, has emerged as a distinct framework for technological and defence cooperation, with a focus on sharing advanced technologies such as nuclear-powered submarines. While the Quad has been criticised for its limited tangible progress, AUKUS has set explicit benchmarks for strategic development, advancing initiatives in areas such as cyber, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum technology.
Concerns about Trump 2.0
A second Trump presidency could pose a serious threat to these nascent arrangements. During his first term, Trump was often dismissive of multilateralism, and his foreign policy was defined by its rejection and degradation of international norms and alliances. This created challenges for US partners in the Indo-Pacific, who found it difficult to align with American initiatives given the administration’s unpredictable behavior.
The Quad’s progress in institutionalising technological cooperation through its Critical and Emerging Technology (CET) Working Group could be undermined by Trump’s disdain for multilateralism and erratic policy shifts. While the Quad has made strides in fostering collaboration on AI and other emerging technologies, the progress has been relatively modest. Critics argue that much more work remains to be done. A destabilising Trump return could hinder the Quad’s ability to deliver on its promises.
Similarly, AUKUS, which has made significant advancements in trilateral defense cooperation, could face uncertainty under a second Trump administration. Significant questions about the future of AUKUS – in particular the nuclear-powered submarine program – already exist, and Trump’s capricious approach to governance could further complicate the partnership. While AUKUS has rapidly expanded its workstreams, including cyber, quantum technology, and hypersonic capabilities, maintaining this momentum requires a stable and committed US leadership. A Trump administration, distracted by domestic concerns or shifting foreign policy priorities, might struggle to provide the necessary support.
Indo-Pacific security cooperation into the future
Beyond the Quad and AUKUS, other minilateral agreements in the Indo-Pacific, such as the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) between the United States, Japan, and Australia, could also be affected by a Trump return. These smaller groupings, which allow for more focused collaboration on specific issues, are becoming increasingly important across the world as countries seek flexible arrangements to address shared regional security concerns.
The challenge for Indo-Pacific nations is to find ways to sustain and advance these minilateral groupings in the face of a potential Trump presidency. For example, policymakers are already grappling with the complexities of addressing AI as a dual-use technology, while also managing limited resources and shifting domestic priorities. The uncertainty injected by a Trump return could exacerbate these challenges, making it harder for the region to achieve concrete breakthroughs in security and technological cooperation.
The Indo-Pacific region stands at a critical juncture as like-minded allies seeks to build a security architecture that is resilient to the rise of China. The steady progress made through agreements including the Quad and AUKUS is a testament to the region’s commitment to collaboration. However, the specter of a Trump return threatens to derail these efforts, as his first term was marked by inconsistency, unpredictability, and a contempt for multilateralism.
Indo-Pacific nations will need to navigate these uncertainties carefully to maintain the momentum of their minilateral partnerships and ensure that the region’s security architecture remains resilient in the face of shifting global dynamics.
