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Last week, US intelligence agencies confirmed Iran was behind a hack of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. The attempted cyber theft is reminiscent of Russian hacking DNC emails during the 2016 election, which saw 12 indicted. Kamala Harris’s presidential campaign was also targeted.
The FBI, Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency pointed the finger at Iran. “Iran,” they said, “seeks to stoke discord and undermine confidence in our democratic institutions” through cyber thefts and disclosures.
Meta also announced the targeting of Biden and Trump associates by Iranian hackers, known as APT42, on WhatsApp. This group has been blamed for previous hacking attempts on Meta platforms as well as by Microsoft and Google. Microsoft assessed Iranian activities are designed to gain intelligence on political campaigns and help them to influence the elections in the future. It follows their April report outlining Russian and Chinese interference.
Foreign interference includes traditional espionage, intellectual property theft, cyber-intrusion, disclosure through to information activities (like mis- and disinformation) and political interference as well as coercion and control of diaspora groups. Definitions vary across borders, but it’s seen to be driven by a foreign power and involve an attempt to improperly and clandestinely interfere in society.
Foreign interference has increased across the board exponentially in the past year.
Concern around foreign interference is felt globally. No one has it figured out, but lots is being trialled.
In October 2023, the leaders of the Five Eyes intelligence agencies made their first joint public appearance issuing a stark warning about Chinese espionage and interference. ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess said in his 2024 annual threat assessment that if Australia “had a threat level for espionage and foreign interference it would be at CERTAIN – the highest level on the scale.”
Russia, China and Iran are most often highlighted by Five Eyes and the tech community. However, Burgess indicated “friendly” countries might be involved, too. The ABC reported activities of Cambodia, Rwanda and Iran as well as Singapore, South Korea, Israel and India. Earlier this year Foreign Minister Penny Wong warned on foreign interference after reports of Indian spies being expelled in 2020. Given the diversity of Australia’s population, it’s likely more countries involved.
Canada’s foreign interference commission shed light on how diaspora communities are affected by foreign interference in its first report released in May. Last month, plots to harm dissidents residing in Australia were revealed by government. Two Russian-born Australians were also charged with spying offences. Earlier this year, Victorian businessman Di Sanh Duong, was the first person found guilty under Australian foreign interference laws.
Concern around foreign interference is felt globally. No one has it figured out, but lots is being trialled.
The US Foreign Malign Influence Center is providing election interference updates in 2024 on countries (Russia, China and Iran) and methods (leveraging foreign marketing and PR companies and exploiting unwitting domestic individuals for amplification of messages).
The EU’s diplomacy arm has been working to counter foreign information manipulation and interference since 2015 and publishes regular threat reports. Often, countries have looked to European efforts including Estonia and Finland for inspiration. The Finns are renowned for resilience to Russian influence efforts, in part due to experience – they’ve faced Kremlin-back propaganda since declaring independence in 1917 – and the acute nature of the challenge (a 1,340-kilometre border with Russia). Extremely high levels of media literacy and education combined with high institutional trust contribute, too. However, exploitable divisions are appearing in Finland and new strategies are needed.
As the scale of the threat has grown, so too has the response. To counter the diversity and depth of threats, measures need to be incorporated across the spectrum of foreign interference. Australia has a relatively comprehensive strategy for countering foreign interference, including foreign interference legislation, an electoral integrity assurance taskforce, university foreign interference task force, strengthening democracy taskforce and counter foreign interference coordination centre and coordinator. I’ll cover mis- and disinformation another time.
The 2024–25 Australian federal budget set aside $66.3 million over four years (and $17 million per year ongoing) to disrupt foreign interference and espionage threats. This included continuing the counter foreign interference taskforce and launching the technology foreign interference taskforce. It also saw funds to prosecute espionage and foreign interference cases and lead policy reform work as well as a pilot to strengthen the critical minerals sector against foreign interference.
In July, Home Affairs introduced mandatory directions for government agencies to improve identification of foreign ownership, control and influence risks in technology, stocktake internet-facing technology assets and share cyber threat intelligence. In August, an amendment to the Defence Act 1903 came into force. Known as Safeguarding Australia’s Military Secrets, it introduces a requirement for some former officials to seek foreign work authorisation and prevent them from disclosing or exploiting classified military or related information.
On the sidelines of the AUSMIN talks in August, Australia became the 20th country to sign an MoU with the United Sates on countering foreign state information manipulation. The Philippines announced this month they will send a team to Australia to learn how to protect against malign influence operations and espionage amid domestic debate, ahead of their 2025 national election.
Despite all this work, the pervasive problem persists and appears to be growing. Yet to be addressed is what US author Casey Michel said describes as “an absolute explosion of the scope and the scale of both foreign lobbying as well as foreign interference.” Problematic political lobbying and bribes by foreign powers have been highlighted across Europe too. Perhaps it is also time to look across the technology landscape and see how to increase the integrity and resilience of digital information ecosystems.