Has Indonesia surrendered its position on the South China Sea?
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto visited China this week, and on 9 November Beijing released a joint statement in English claiming a “common understanding” with Indonesia “on joint development in areas of overlapping claims” of maritime territories. While one can interpret “overlapping claims” as referring to other areas, many have suggested this phrase concerns the portion of Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that China claims within its so-called “nine-dash line” (some say “ten-dash line”).
Since 2017, Indonesia has called this portion the “North Natuna Sea” because of its proximity to Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. Jakarta has never before formally acknowledged China’s competing claim, much less suggested joint development of the area. Worse, at no point was the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) even mentioned in the joint statement despite the two countries’ adherence to “respective prevailing laws and regulations”.
Clearly, China had won a diplomatic coup.
Yet there is room for giving the English-language joint statement the benefit of the doubt. On 11 November, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry clarified, saying the joint statement should not be read “in any way as a recognition of the ‘9-Dash Line’ claim…which lacks an international legal basis and is tantamount to undermining the UNCLOS 1982.” On 12 November, the Indonesian navy chief likewise said Indonesia’s EEZ “does not overlap” with China’s claim.
That said, the Mandarin version of the joint statement erased any doubt that the reference to “overlapping claims” included the North Natuna Sea. The Mandarin version can be translated into English as: “The two sides reached important consensus on carrying out joint development in the overlapping waters claimed by the two countries”. The Mandarin version, in other words, refers explicitly to the “overlapping claims” between Indonesia and China, which is the North Natuna Sea.
Although Indonesia certainly compromised with China in the joint statement, there was nothing in the statement guaranteeing that Indonesia would abide by it. After all, it is only a statement, not an agreement.
What explained the difference between the English and Mandarin versions? One possibility is technical and administrative lapses. However, there could be a larger, more sinister, motivation at work, which is that Indonesia had implicitly accepted China’s nine-dash line in return for economic largesse.
But although Indonesia certainly compromised with China in the joint statement, there was nothing in the statement guaranteeing that Indonesia would abide by it. After all, it is only a statement, not an agreement. The fact that the joint statement was only released by China speaks volumes about Indonesia’s reservations or at least concern about a potential backlash. It’s possible Indonesia only agreed to the statement as a means to test regional and domestic reactions.
Furthermore, per the English statement, both countries “agreed to establish an Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee” and “to make full use of the China-Indonesia Technical Committee on Maritime Cooperation (TCM)” as well as “the China-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation Fund”. These committees depend on Indonesia’s consent to set up and run, which gives Jakarta some degree of control.
There is no guarantee Indonesia will cooperate with China as much as Beijing wants. Even as the two countries are keen to “actively step up institutional cooperation between their coast guards”, Indonesian law enforcement authorities were publicising standoffs with Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels. On 21 and 24 October, for example, the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) claimed to have driven away CCG vessels from Natuna waters.
It is too much and too soon to argue that such standoffs will never repeat in the future. Indonesia’s approach to South China Sea issues is handled by multiple ministries and agencies. Each has its own interests and priorities on maritime and South China Sea issues.
Still, the buck stops with the president. And if the past is any guide, Prabowo Subianto’s foreign policy will be unpredictable at best. At the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in his role as defence minister, he suggested a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine War, proposing that Ukraine acknowledge the existence of disputed territories claimed by Russia. It surprised many observers, and the China-Indonesia joint statement was no less surprising.
But unpredictability can cut both ways. And Prabowo is consistently wary of great powers, China included. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry’s repudiation of the joint statement is not exceptional. Prabowo went to Washington, DC after his China visit, and in his joint statement with US President Joe Biden on 12 November, Prabowo noted “the ruling of the 2016 arbitral tribunal, constituted pursuant to UNCLOS”. This means Prabowo himself publicly confirms that China’s nine-dash line is invalid, the first Indonesian president to do so.
That Indonesia recently concluded a joint naval exercise with distant Russia, rather than with the more proximate China, was telling. Military cooperation with China, including exercises and arms sales, will also resume or increase after about a decade of hiatus. But none planned so far indicates a significant departure from past activities. Again, this may reflect some element of unpredictability, but not an absence of Indonesian strategic anxiety about China.
