As great power competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific, so too has contestation over power-transition narratives. On the one hand, there are those that see US power in steep decline. With China’s increasing economic and military might, even the former hegemon’s traditional alliances are likely to falter. A US withdrawal from the region is only a matter of time. On the other, there are those that see China as a paper tiger. Beijing’s increased tempo of military operations in the South China Seas and its continued investment in Belt and Road Initiatives in the region are only masks for its inherent economic and demographic weakness.
We often struggle to define “power”. For some, power is simply capabilities, in particular the military and economic capabilities that a country can potentially deploy.
In the face of these competing narratives, the Asia Power Index gives us something different: facts. And not just facts, but facts that belie any simple stories about the balance of power and Indo-Pacific regional politics. Before getting into what the Asia Power Index tells us about the changing distribution of power in the region, it is worth taking a moment to talk about how these researchers are conceptualising and measuring power. We often struggle to define “power”. For some, power is simply capabilities, in particular the military and economic capabilities that a country can potentially deploy. Relying on capabilities to measure power is tempting — measuring a country’s power becomes a simple matter of counting — but it is also problematic. We can think of plenty of cases where countries fail to translate their material might into successful power politics.
To address this problem, the Asia Power Index researchers have taken on the difficult work of parsing power into two categories: measures of capabilities and measures of influence. For the former, they rely on many of the standard metrics of a country’s strength, including GDP, defence spending, and so forth. To measure influence, the researchers take a relational and network turn in their methodology. Here, they rely on a range of novel measures of power, ranging from economic investments to participation in multilateral fora to minister-level diplomatic engagements. This network data is not easy to come by, and is itself a major contribution of the Index.
Of course, most readers of the Asia Power Index will be less interested in how the data was collected than in what it tells us about the emerging distribution of power in the Indo-Pacific. Three key points emerge from the data, each of which should give pause to pundits weaving simple power-transition stories about the region. To begin with, there is no evidence of rapid or irrevocable US decline. Indeed, the United States continues to dominate, not only in capabilities, but in its diplomatic, economic, and military influence in the region. But while the United States has staying power, China is hardly losing ground. While it’s true that China lacks the regional security networks that the United States has nurtured, this is hardly surprising: China has traditionally avoided long-term military commitments, a policy not likely to change. But China’s economic relations in the region continue to give it significant influence. Interestingly, however, the report raises questions about China’s ability to continue these investments in the future. As China faces growing constraints on its economic growth — especially demographic constraints — its regional economic investments are likely to decline.
Raw data can only get us so far: it is through narratives that we ultimately make sense of the information in front of us.
Second, the data in the Asia Power Index underscore that the US “pivot” to the Indo-Pacific is less about shifts in the great power’s own capabilities, and more about building up its critical partners in the region. As the authors argue, the Index demonstrates that the Biden administration’s “latticework of cooperation” is becoming a tangible reality. It is not simply that the United States has increased the tempo of its cooperation with key allies, most notably Japan, South Korea, and Australia. It is that these allies — especially Japan — have amplified their own diplomatic influence, becoming key hubs for bilateral and multilateral relations in the region. A related point: based on this data, the authors cast doubt on the narrative that the upcoming US election in November will be a key turning point for its Indo-Pacific relations. Because the Biden administration has focused on building up key regional partners, we now have the foundations of a military and diplomatic system that can function, to at least some extent, in the face of wavering American support.
Third, the data challenge the narrative that we are swiftly moving towards a Cold War world of hardening “blocs”. On the one hand, it is the case that the United States focuses heavily on its traditional alliance partners: the report shows, for example, that 40 per cent of its diplomatic engagement focuses on “Quad” partners, Australia, India, and Japan. But what the report also demonstrates is the emerging influence of middle powers. During the Cold War, we might have called these countries “non-aligned”, but that seems far too passive a term for what the Index captures here. Japan’s bilateral meetings have increased so much that the report casts the region as “tripolar” when it comes to diplomatic influence. Both the Philippines and Malaysia are convening regional diplomatic dialogues. Indonesia’s investment in both diplomatic and economic ties belies perceptions of that country as insular and isolated. And while India’s rise remains slow, future demographic trends suggest another pole in the making.
To be clear, narratives are still critical to our understanding of Indo-Pacific politics. Raw data can only get us so far: it is through narratives that we ultimately make sense of the information in front of us. The data itself cannot tell us whether we are likely to see a major power conflict in the region, nor can it tell us why a country might gain or lose diplomatic influence or legitimacy. But our narratives are only so good as the information that informs them. Hopefully the information in the Asia Power Index will give scholars and pundits pause about the stories we use to understand the Indo-Pacific.
