Writing in The Interpreter last week, Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch, made a compelling case for Australian leaders to raise human rights concerns with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Australia. Pearson cited shrinking civic space in India, a crackdown on free speech, and discrimination and violence against Muslims and Christians as key concerns.
There are also strong strategic and foreign policy reasons for Australia to speak up on the human rights in India in order to forge a more resilient bilateral relationship. Silence at this growth phase of the relationship could undermine its long-term success. Australia is creating a difficult precedent for itself, making it harder to speak in the future without causing irreparable damage. Moreover, Modi won’t be prime minister forever. Australia needs to invest in an enduring relationship with India, and that includes the 63 per cent of voters who did not support Modi in the 2019 elections.
While political level advocacy would be ideal, Australia can make use of its independent foreign policy actors at arm’s length from executive government that to raise awareness and promote discussion. Taking this approach puts distance between core bilateral diplomacy and human rights advocacy, reducing the risk of foreign policy blowback, while still speaking with force and legitimacy. In building relationships, Australia can use “all elements” of national power, including ones not under government control.
Here are three options that Australia could pursue – potentially all in tandem.
The Australian Human Rights Commission should engage India
Australia’s Human Rights Commission, an independent statutory organisation created by the Australian parliament, could conduct a targeted program of research on human rights in India, as well as bilateral engagement with Indian counterparts. With an independent mandate, the Commission focusing on India would be a way for Australia to engage New Delhi on human rights in a forthright way while giving Australian diplomats the ability to plausibly say such advocacy was beyond their control.
The Commission has run bilateral technical human rights programs with Vietnam and Laos, as well as with ASEAN. It has a cooperation program with China, although this appears to be dormant given there has been no mention of it in the Commission’s annual reports since 2018-19. So, there is certainly precedent for the Commission to perform such a role – working on human rights in sensitive contexts with the imprimatur of the Australian state, but at arm’s length from core bilateral engagement.
While the context is different, Australia should also take confidence from the fact that US-India ties have continued to grow despite the very frank and detailed critiques of India’s human rights record that the US State Department have published in recent years. The Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are required under US legislation to be compiled for every UN member state. Put simply, it is possible to have a productive bilateral relationship while also being forthright on human rights.
Parliament should conduct an inquiry into growing Australia-India ties
The Australian parliament, through its various accountability mechanisms including inquiries by committees of elected representatives, can also play an important role. A parliamentary inquiry into the entirety of the Australia-India relationship would be very timely, given its current growth trajectory. This could be initiated by the government itself, or by either house of parliament.
Parliamentarians can play a valuable role as independent foreign policy actors in the Australian system, pursuing agendas that might be too difficult for the government to prosecute (or that it might be unwilling to). The late senator Kimberley Kitching, among others, was a driving force behind Australia legislating a Magnitsky-style sanctions regime, for instance. Parliamentarians can also forge important relationships with international counterparts, sharing lessons, cooperating to legislate on shared concerns, and pushing their respective governments to take action.
A parliamentary inquiry could examine the human rights situation in India and actively question the government. It would be essential that independent and minor party representatives be active members of such an inquiry. Ministers and bureaucrats would be put on the spot to explicitly outline their calculations regarding India in terms of human rights advocacy vis-à-vis building and maintaining influence with the Modi government. Another important effect of such inquiries is to create space for potentially difficult conversations and provide a platform for experts and civil society.
Make human rights and minority perspectives part of the Centre for Australia-India Relations’ programs
Finally, the government’s new Centre for Australia-India Relations should strongly consider funding initiatives through its grants programs that address human rights issues and that empower perspectives of minority groups in India. If the Centre wants to contribute to a truly robust and sustainable bilateral relationship, it can play a constructive role in helping address and increase understanding of these difficult issues. The scholarships to Indian students to study in Australia, the secondments of Indian researchers to Australian think tanks, or the cultural grants to artistic and community groups could all play a role promoting dialogue on the diversity of Indian cultures and the challenges around political and civil rights.
In this, the Centre should look to the example set by the National Foundation for Australia-China Relations, which was established in 2020 to provide “a national platform that engages government, business and communities to support and find ways to engage constructively with China, across greater China and to involve our diverse stakeholders and communities”. The value of the Foundation lies in promoting bilateral ties with China on terms “consistent with [Australia’s] national interest” while taking a broader and more inclusive view of Chinese and Chinese-Australian identity than that promoted by the Chinese Communist Party. Its grants program, for instance, has promoted cultural and business exchanges with Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as supporting organisations to showcase the long history of Chinese-Australian communities and their contributions to Australia.
Whatever options it might pursue, the core message is clear: a stronger relationship with India will only be possible if fundamental questions of human dignity are on the table for discussion. That goes both ways. Australia being open to critique about its own imperfections – especially regarding its treatment of First Nations people – will make dialogue with India on human rights more reciprocal.
Given how much potential lies in growing their ties, Australians and Indians alike deserve better than a relationship too brittle to endure difficult topics.
